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In Constitutional law, the Last Resort Rule is a largely prudential rule which gives a federal court the power to avoid a constitutional issue in some circumstances. This rule dictates that, even if all other jurisdictional and justiciability obstacles are surmounted, federal courts still must avoid a constitutional issue if there is any other ground upon which to render a final judgment. The last resort rule can function as a distinct barrier to Constitutional avoidance. It is articulated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority. ==The First Application== Brandeis cited two examples in Ashwander of the "most varied application" of the last resort rule. First, as between two potential grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will only decide the latter.〔Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347.〕 To the extent the question involves statutory construction and a plausible interpretation of the statute might obviate the need for constitutional review, this example replicates the seventh rule of the avoidance doctrine. To illustrate this first application, Brandeis relied primarily on Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.〔213 U.S. 175 (1909).〕 In Siler, a railroad company challenged an order by the Kentucky railroad commission setting maximum rates on commodities transported by rail within the state.〔Id. at 176-77.〕 The company asserted a takings claim and a Commerce Clause claim under the United States Constitution, as well as state law claims, including a claim that the commission had exceeded its statutory authorization in making such an order.〔 Id. at 177. The Court itself proceeded to review the state law claims, although Kentucky's highest court had never construed the pertinent statute. The Court concluded that the commission had exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the challenged order. Id. at 194-96.〕 The Supreme Court upheld the lower federal court's order enjoining enforcement of the maximum rate order. The Court indicated, however, that the lower court should have enjoined the rate order on state law grounds, without reaching the federal constitutional grounds.〔Id. at 191.〕 The Court in Siler confirmed that once the lower court properly determined that it had federal question jurisdiction, the court had the right to decide either all questions or only the state law questions. The Siler Court stated that where a case can be decided without reference to questions arising under the federal Constitution, that course is "usually pursued and is not departed from without important reasons."〔213 U.S. at 193.〕 The Court declared it better to decide the case with regard to the construction of the state statute, and the authority therein given to the Commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record.〔The only other case cited by Brandeis for the first application of the "last resort rule" is Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538 (1911), in which the Court followed the principle of avoiding a constitutional issue by ruling on an alternative ground, relying on the Siler formulation. Both cases involved claims that originated in federal courts seeking injunctive relief under an Ex parte Young theory. Those types of actions particularly troubled Justice Brandeis because they could involve intrusive federal court orders and federalism tensions.〕 The Siler Court offered no case precedent or doctrinal ground for this policy decision. The discretionary nature of the Court's decision limits the extent to which Siler serves as a primary basis for an absolute last resort rule. After recognizing the lower court's authority to decide the constitutional questions, the Court decided to follow the "usual course" of avoiding such questions if questions of local law would resolve the dispute. This purely prudential formulation of the rule allows courts to dispense with the rule for "important reasons." 1 Although Brandeis prefaced his avoidance doctrine discussion in Ashwander by casting the seven rules as prudential, his formulation of the last resort rule omits this "important reasons" qualification. Thus, an evaluation of the proper scope of the last resort rule requires a determination of whether the qualifying phrase should be employed, or whether the rule should be viewed as an absolute.〔See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Pullman Court refused to follow its method of disposing of the issues in Siler -- rather than decide the state issues itself, the Court sent the case back to the state court via abstention.〕 "Pullman abstention" represents the most prominent development of this initial application of the last resort rule after Ashwander. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Last resort rule」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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